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LEGALITY OF ATTACKS AGAINST HUMAN SHIELDS IN ARMED CONFLICT 
Eduard Hovsepyan* 
 
Abstract: The numerous examples of the use of human shields in armed conflicts display the 
contemporaneity of the problem discussed in this article and the need for a recipe to 
effectively combat the continuing commission of this war crime. In spite of the fact that an 
absolute prohibition on the use of human shields in international armed conflicts exists, as 
enshrined in the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Additional Protocol I, consequences of 
unlawful resort to human shields remain inconsistent. Thus, the present article will determine 
when and under what circumstances attacks carried out against human shields are lawful, and 
which principles of international humanitarian law must be taken into account by the 
attacking party. 
 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
‘No matter what cause one defends, it will suffer permanent disgrace if one resorts to blind 
attacks on crowds of innocent people.’ (Albert Camus)1 
 
This article will examine the issues relating to the legality of attacks against human shields in 
armed conflict. It will focus primarily on international armed conflict, exploring the legal 
framework and principles of international humanitarian law (‘IHL’) governing the obligations 
of attacking and defending parties. The focus is placed on international armed conflict 
(‘IAC’) because of the customary international law status which the norms pertaining to the 
use of human shields have obtained over time in that context. Nevertheless, given the 
growing number and impact of conflicts of a non-international character, an attempt will be 
made to address rules relevant to that context, providing examples to better illustrate the 
present findings.  
Authors have often referred to the term ‘human shields’ as: 
The intentional use of a party to a conflict of one or more human beings, usually 
civilians, or captured members of the adversary's forces ... placed between the 
adversary and themselves in a way meant to deter an attack against the forces using 
the human shields, for fear of killing or harming the unarmed shields. The shields are 
in effect hostages used for strategic purposes.2  
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1 Albert Camus, Algerian Chronicles (Harvard University Press 2013) 27. 
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However, this definition may not be entirely accurate. As will be examined in section 
C, not all human shields are intentionally placed as such against their will by defending 
parties. In some cases, protected persons voluntarily expose themselves to attacks in an 
attempt to deter the attacking party from carrying out an attack. This is why Schmitt’s more 
concise definition will be preferred, which states that ‘[h]uman shielding involves the use of 
persons protected by international humanitarian law, such as prisoners of war or civilians, to 
deter attacks on combatants and military objectives.’3 This includes all possible situations of 
use of human shields, namely moving civilians to protect a military target, deploying military 
targets among civilians (so-called ‘unknowing human shields’) or simply benefiting from the 
voluntary exposure of civilians to military attacks. 
The issue proves to be extremely topical given the frequent violations of the existing absolute 
prohibition of the use of human shields. Violations include notorious cases such as 
‘Operation Iraqi Freedom’ in 2003 and the NATO campaign in Yugoslavia in 1999 when 
Serbian civilians took up positions on the bridges of Belgrade to prevent them from being 
bombed.4 Apart from these more well-known examples, other illustrations of similar conduct 
include the use of involuntary human shields by the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, or for 
instance, the deployment of arms and munitions among civilians by Hezbollah militiamen in 
the Second Lebanon War in 2006.5 Widely discussed also is the use of human shields in 
Gaza, as well as in the ongoing Syrian conflict.6  
The following sections will delve into several distinct but interrelated issues. To begin with, 
the main instruments regulating the prohibition of human shields will be examined. The 
relevant provisions of the Hague Regulations, Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I 
(‘AP I’) will be explored, as well as the Rome Statute.  
After outlining the ban on the use of human shields and the relevant principles of IHL, those 
rules will be applied to examples from international practice in section C to better illustrate 
the findings of the article. Most importantly, the section will assess the legal status of human 
shields, analysing the levels of protection enjoyed by the persons forming the shield under 
																																																																																																																																																																								
2 Victor Conde, A Handbook of International Human Rights Terminology (2nd edn, University of Nebraska 
Press 2004) 114; eg in Amnon Rubinstein and Yaniv Roznai, ‘Human Shields in Modern Armed Conflicts: The 
Need for a Proportionate Proportionality’ (2011) 22 Stanford Law & Policy Review 93, 94. 
3 Michael Schmitt, ‘Human Shields in International Humanitarian Law’ (2009) 47 Columbia Journal of 
Transnational Law 292, 309.  
4 Stéphanie Bouchié de Belle, ‘Chained to Cannons or Wearing Targets on Their T-shirts: Human Shields in 
International Humanitarian Law’ (2008) 90 International Review of the Red Cross 883, 884. 
5 See also Matthew Ezzo and Amos Guiora, A Critical Decision Point on the Battlefield – Friend, Foe, or 
Innocent Bystander, Security: A Multidisciplinary Normative Approach (Martinus Nijhoff/Brill 2009) 103–107. 
6 UNHRC, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism’ (16 June 2015) UN Doc A/HRC/29/51 [51]. 
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IHL. Furthermore, the section will consider whether human shields retain their civilian 
protection or could be considered as taking direct participation in hostilities and how this 
affects the attacking party’s obligations. A distinction between involuntary and voluntary 
human shields will be made. The purpose of this section is to examine under what conditions 
the attacks would be lawful, focusing on the principles of distinction and proportionality, as 
well as on the obligation to take precautionary measures under AP I.  
Finally, the article arrives at two pivotal findings. First, both voluntary and involuntary 
human shields generally retain their civilian status with an exception for voluntary shields in 
certain circumstances. Second, the principle of proportionality continues to apply despite the 
use of human shields. Nevertheless, a less restrictive proportionality assessment is possible 
when civilians are voluntarily protecting military objectives. The application of these two 
principles would not be precluded by an issuing of an advance warning by the attacking 
party. 
 
B.  LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
    1.  The Hague Regulations  
Under the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 an explicit reference to the term ‘human 
shield’ does not exist. However, Article 23 of the 1907 Hague Convention Respecting the 
Law and Customs of War on Land states that ‘[a] belligerent is forbidden to compel the 
nationals of the hostile party to take part in the operations of war directed against their own 
country’.7 It is worth noting that initially this provision was not included in the Draft 
Convention. It was suggested by the German delegation in furtherance of the principle 
accepted in 1899 concerning forced participation of the population of an occupied territory in 
military operations against their country.8 It extended this principle to all citizens of the 
occupied state’s territory, including even foreign subjects who might have been in the service 
of the hostile party before the commencement of the war.9 The Austro-Hungarian delegation 
proposed an amendment to this text, limiting the prohibition to compel the nationals of the 
hostile party to take part as combatants only.10 Thus the Austro-Hungarian delegation desired 
a clear distinction to be drawn between ‘operations of war’ – in which the population of the 
																																																						
7 1907 Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and Its Annex: Regulations 
Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land (adopted 18 October 1907, entered into force on 26 January 
1910) art 23. 
8 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, The Proceedings of the Hague Peace Conferences: Volume I 
(OUP 1920) 97. 
9 ibid. 
10 ibid. 
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hostile state cannot be compelled to take part – and certain ‘military services’ which, in some 
cases, a belligerent should be free to impose on the civilian population, according to that 
delegation.11 Nevertheless, this view was not shared by the majority and the German proposal 
was accepted by 23 votes in favour, nine against and one abstention.12 The adoption of this 
text and the rejection of Austria-Hungary’s proposal proves the drafters’ intention to outlaw 
any act aimed at using nationals of the other belligerent party in the conduct of hostilities, 
regardless of whether the nationals were used as combatants or not. In light of this, it may be 
assumed that the prohibition of using these nationals as human shields against their own state 
is included in this provision. As General Jonkheer den Beer Poortugael stated during the 
Conference, ‘[if] it is true that war is made by State upon State, let us not force inhabitants to 
mingle in the struggle; above all let us not force them to commit villainies’.13 
However, Germany was arguably the first state to violate this provision. During World War I 
an official commission of the Belgian government blamed the German forces of using 
‘human screens’.14 The Germans were accused of placing civilians in front of their military 
lines in order to prevent the Belgian army from attacking them. The Commission further 
stipulated that ‘[i]f it be not permissible to compel a man to fire on his fellow citizens, neither 
can he be forced to protect the enemy and to serve as a living screen’.15  
 In sum, given the wide condemnation that Germany faced for its actions, which were 
tantamount to using human shields, it can be concluded that an implicit prohibition on the use 
of human shields could be traced back to the beginning of the 20th century despite the 
difference in terminology. Thus, the Hague Regulations succeeded in setting a common 
standard according to which nationals of a belligerent party must not be coerced in any way 
to contribute to the military effort of the hostile party. Yet the numerous atrocities which 
followed during the World Wars made it clear that the principle of protection of the civilian 
population and hors de combat should be further regulated. This prompted the convening of 
the Geneva Conferences and the adoption of the four conventions of 1949. 
2.  The Geneva Conventions of 1949 
																																																						
11 ibid. 
12 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, The Proceedings of the Hague Peace Conferences: Volume III 
(OUP 1921) 12. 
13 ibid 11. 
14 Neve Gordon and Nicola Perugini, ‘The Politics of Human Shielding: On the Resignification of Space and the 
Constitution of Civilians as Shields in Liberal Wars’ (2016) 34 Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 
168, 171–72.  
15 ibid. 
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The outcome of the Conferences in 1949 was the adoption of two articles which, again 
without expressly referring to the term ‘human shields’, precluded the use of civilians and 
hors de combat for the purpose of rendering certain points or areas immune from military 
operations. Although bearing resemblance to the previous Article 23 of the Hague 
Regulations, the new approach introduced some important novelties, but was limited only to 
the scope of the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions. It was enshrined in articles 23 and 
28, respectively.  
 Article 23 of the Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of 
War provides that ‘[n]o prisoner of war may at any time be sent to, or detained in areas where 
he may be exposed to the fire of the combat zone, nor may his presence be used to render 
certain points or areas immune from military operations’.16 The chosen phrase ‘at any time’ 
shows the provision is absolute.17 The detaining party has the obligation to evacuate prisoners 
not only following capture in accordance with Article 19 of the same Convention,18 but also 
whenever any shift in the front may result in prisoners being in the combat zone.19 
 Article 28 of the Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian 
Persons in Time of War is more concise, stating that ‘[t]he presence of a protected person 
may not be used to render certain points or areas immune from military operations’.20 The 
main purpose of this article is to distinguish between ruses of war, which are permissible, and 
acts of barbarity, which are unlawful.21 Article 24 of the Hague Convention (IV) Respecting 
the Law and Customs of War on Land states that ‘[r]uses of war and the employment of 
measures necessary for obtaining information about the enemy and the country are 
considered permissible’.22 However, ruses of war are not a valid pretext for breaking the law. 
Pictet elaborates that the lawfulness of ruses of war depends on the observance of the laws 
and customs of war, which are themselves based on the principle of respect for the civilian 
																																																						
16 1949 Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (adopted 12 August 1949, 
entered into force 21 October 1950) 75 UNTS 135 (GCIII) art 23. 
17 Jean Pictet, Commentary to the III Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War 
(International Committee of the Red Cross 1960) 187. 
18 ‘Prisoners of war shall be evacuated, as soon as possible after their capture, to camps situated in an area far 
enough from the combat zone for them to be out of danger’. 
19 Pictet (n 17) 187. 
20 Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (adopted 12 August 
1949, entered into force 21 October 1950) 75 UNTS 287 (GCIV) art 28. 
21 Jean Pictet, Commentary to the IV Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time 
of War (International Committee of the Red Cross 1958) 208. 
22 1907 Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and Its Annex: Regulations 
Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land (adopted 18 October 1907, entered into force on 26 January 
1910) (HCIV) art 24. 
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population. Consequently, the presence of civilians must never be used to render immune 
from military operations objectives which are liable to be attacked.23 
 Hence, it can be observed that an absolute ban on the use of civilians as means of 
protecting military targets existed in the Geneva Conventions of 1949. Still, the fact remains 
that an explicit prohibition regarding the use of human shields was not discussed at the time. 
The travaux préparatoires show that the term was not clearly brought up during the 
negotiations. The representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross (‘ICRC’) 
put forward the idea regarding Draft Article 21 (Article 23 of Geneva Convention III) that 
prisoners of war should have the same protection against air bombardment and other hazards 
of war as the civilian population, whilst the Irish delegation expressed the view that any 
protective measure taken on behalf of the civilian population should be extended to prisoners 
of war in cases where the camp administration was not in a position to provide adequate 
protection for them.24 The substance of Draft Article 25a (Article 28 of Geneva Convention 
IV) was not discussed. It was not until 1977 when AP I was adopted and an explicit provision 
pertaining to human shields was introduced. 
    3.  Additional Protocol I of 1977 
Prior to the adoption of AP I, the ban on the use of human shields was enshrined in the Third 
and Fourth Geneva Conventions of 1949. This meant that the scope of the prohibition 
concerned only prisoners of war and protected persons. On the other hand, Article 51(7) of 
AP I concerns the civilian population as a whole, extending the ban not only ratione 
personae, but also ratione materiae.25 
 This is where the word ‘shield’ first appeared. It was laid out in Article 51(7) which 
stipulates that ‘the presence or movements of the civilian population or individual civilians 
shall not be used to render certain points or areas immune from military operations, in 
particular in attempts to shield military objectives from attacks or to shield, favour or impede 
military operations’.26 It further states that ‘the Parties to the conflict shall not direct the 
movement of the civilian population or individual civilians in order to attempt to shield 
military objectives from attacks or to shield military operations’.27 Thus, this provision 
																																																						
23 Pictet (n 17) 208. 
24 ‘Final Record of the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva of 1949’ (Geneva 21 April 1949–12 August 1949) 
(vol II(A)) 254. 
25 Bouchié de Belle (n 4) 886. 
26 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims 
of International Armed Conflicts (adopted 8 June 1977, entered into force on 7 December 1978) 1125 UNTS 3 
(AP I) art 51(7). 
27 ibid. 
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reiterates the absolute prohibition set out in the previous Geneva Conventions and yet the use 
of human shields does not necessarily exclude the possibility of a legitimate attack carried out 
against them.28 This is a focal point for the analysis on the legality of attacks against the 
shielding party. 
 During the negotiations for the adoption of the two Additional Protocols, it was 
highlighted that special emphasis should be attached to the problem of protection of the 
civilian population. Mr. Balken, who participated in the negotiations in his role as vice-
president of the German Federal Republic, expressed the view that ‘world public opinion 
expected important results from the work of the Conference: a substantial reaffirmation and 
development of international humanitarian law, an impressive demonstration of the universal 
character of the Geneva Conventions’.29 He further noted that, consequently, Article 51 (draft 
Article 46) should be regarded as a key provision in the Protocol and should be adopted.30 
This approach clearly demonstrates the willingness of certain delegations to face the issue of 
civilian protection in armed conflict – an issue which also includes the use of human shields. 
Similar positions were also taken by the delegations of Greece, Romania, Iraq and the 
German Democratic Republic.31  
 However, Article 51 was not adopted by consensus. The French delegation opposed 
its adoption, claiming that some of the provisions of the article, including paragraph 7 of the 
Final Act (Draft Article 46(5)), would ‘by their very complexity seriously hamper the 
conduct of defensive military operations against an invader and prejudice the exercise of the 
inherent right of legitimate defence recognised in Article 51 of the Charter of the United 
Nations.’32 It further argued that the determination of ‘clearly separated and distinct military 
objectives’ as laid down in paragraph 7 of the Final Act could be unrealisable on certain 
occasions.33 Thus, the delegation perceived the article as going ‘beyond its humanitarian aim’ 
and that it was likely to seriously impair the inherent right of legitimate self-defence.34 
Eventually, in spite of some dissensions, the article was adopted with 77 votes in favour, 16 
abstentions, and one vote against – that of France.35 
																																																						
28 Judith Butler, ‘Human Shields’ (2015) 3 London Review of International Law 223, 224. 
29‘Official Records of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International 
Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts’ (Geneva 20 February 1974–10 June 1977) (vol V) 131. 
30 ibid. 
31 ibid.  
32 Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law (n 29) (vol 
VI) 162. 
33 ibid. 
34 ibid. 
35 ibid. 
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 In its Commentary, the ICRC stated that fears expressed by the French delegation 
could not be justified.36 The approach of the ICRC seems more reasonable since the right to 
self-defence should not include the use of measures that would be contrary to IHL. Indeed, 
the French delegation’s proposal gained little support during the Conference. The dismissal 
of the French proposal also indicates the international community’s concern as to the 
importance of this provision and hence the vast majority of states ruled out the possibility that 
it might be left out of the final text. But even more importantly, the right to self-defence was 
clearly perceived as not encompassing the use of civilians and civilian objects for shielding 
military targets. 
 Finally, it can be concluded that the importance of the regulations regarding the 
protection of the civilian population had grown immensely by the time the Protocol was 
adopted. This is manifested by the fact that in the draft the ICRC stated that Article 51 would 
be among the provisions to which no reservations could be made.37 Even though the 
Conference deleted all provisions relating to the possibility of making reservations, in its 
Commentary the ICRC specified that reservations to this article, even partial ones, could 
jeopardise the balance achieved with difficulty between the divergent views that emerged in 
the Diplomatic Conference.38 Thus, any such reservation would be against the object and 
purpose of this ‘indispensable provision’.39 These findings are essential in terms of the issue 
of human shields, because they extend to paragraph 7. 
 The last remaining step in the codification of the prohibition of the use of human 
shields was its definition as a war crime entailing individual criminal responsibility under 
international criminal law. This step was at last taken in 1998 with the adoption of the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC). 
    4.  The Rome Statute of 1998 
The use of human shields during an international armed conflict is characterised as a war 
crime under Article 8(2)(b)(xxiii). It is defined as ‘utilizing the presence of a civilian or other 
protected person to render certain points, areas or military forces immune from military 
operations’.40  
																																																						
36 Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski and Bruno Zimmermann, Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 
June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 (International Committee of the Red Cross 1987) 615. 
37 ibid 616. 
38 ibid. 
39 ibid. 
40 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (adopted on 17 July 1998, entered into force 1 July 2002, 
last amended 2010) 2187 UNTS 38544 (Rome Statute) art 8(2)(b)(xxiii). 
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 Examining the drafting history of the ICC Statute, it is worth mentioning the 
statement of the Kuwaiti representative who, by addressing the frequent use of human beings 
as shields by some countries, proposed that such acts should be listed as a crime against 
humanity.41 This proposal demonstrates the concern by this particular delegation caused by 
the continuing violations of rules pertaining to human shields as a result of widespread and 
systematic policies. This particularly follows from practice during the Gulf War (1991) and 
the Yugoslav Wars.  
 Another important aspect is whether this prohibition applies to both involuntary and 
voluntary human shields. The ICC Elements of Crimes provide four elements of this war 
crime, namely: 
1. The perpetrator moved or otherwise took advantage of the location of one or more civilians 
or other persons protected under the international law of armed conflict. 
2. The perpetrator intended to shield a military objective from attack or shield, favour or 
impede military operations. 
3. The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an international armed 
conflict. 
4. The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the existence of an 
armed conflict.42 
There appears to be no requirement that the civilians are taken as hostages, or that they have 
chosen voluntarily to act as human shields. Rather, the essential element is the intention to 
use the presence of humans as shields to shelter a military objective from attack or to shield, 
favour or impede military operations.43 The difficulties in this case arise from the assessment 
of the intent of the defending party which must be made on a case-by-case basis.44 
 There has also been some discussion in relation to Element 1. Some delegations 
expressed the view that the wording ‘or otherwise took advantage of the location’ failed to 
capture both the situation where civilians are already present at a certain place and the 
situation where civilians voluntarily move to a place.45 Therefore they suggested, by referring 
																																																						
41 ‘Summary records of the meetings of the Committee of the Whole’ UN Diplomatic Conference of 
Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court (Rome 15 June–17 July 1998) (17 
June 1998) UN Doc A/CONF.183/13 (vol II) 149. 
42 ‘Elements of Crimes’ Official Records of the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (New York 3–10 September 2002) ICC-ASP/1/3/Add.1 (vol II) 143. 
43 Bouchié de Belle (n 4) 889. 
44 ibid. 
45 Knut Dörmann, Louise Doswald-Beck and Robert Kolb, Elements of War Crimes under the Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court: Sources and Commentary (CUP 2003) 344. 
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to AP I, that the word ‘location’ in Element 1 be changed to ‘presence or movements’.46 
Other delegations claimed that the proposed formulations would be too restrictive and that 
‘location’ is not only sufficient but it is broader than ‘presence’ and would also cover every 
variation of location.47 They also underlined that what is important in this crime is not the 
type of movement or location being used, but the intended use, as expressed in Element 2. 
With that clarification, the proposed elements for this crime were accepted without change.48 
These debates prove that the prohibition extends to all types of human shields discussed in 
this article. In sum, the Rome Statute makes no distinction between involuntary and voluntary 
human shields, meaning that any use of human shields in an international armed conflict 
could potentially entail individual criminal responsibility.  
 The Rome Statute completes the codification of the rules relating to human shields, 
forming the contemporary legal framework alongside AP I. The prohibition is clear and 
vested in the international instruments discussed above. This framework delineates definition 
of human shields and the consequences for the defending party. The next question that needs 
to be addressed is what are the corresponding obligations of the attacking party? In section C 
the rules of distinction, proportionality and precaution (focusing on advance warnings) will 
be considered in order to ascertain specific conclusions regarding the attacking party’s rights 
and obligations.  
    5.  Human Shields in non-international armed conflict 
Before moving on to section C, it is necessary to briefly mention the rules regulating the use 
of human shields in non-international armed conflict (‘NIAC’). As stated in the introduction, 
the reason the current study focuses on the rules applicable in IACs is not because they are 
deemed to be of greater importance. On the contrary, the occurrence of international armed 
conflicts has substantively decreased in comparison to NIACs. Furthermore, a number of the 
examples mentioned in sections A and C have taken place in the context of a NIAC. Hence, 
the focus on the norms of international armed conflict can be explained by the fact that all 
relevant provisions contained in the Hague Regulations, Geneva Conventions and AP I 
pertaining to human shields are considered to reflect customary IHL.49  
 The problem concerning the use of human shields in NIACs used to be the lack of an 
express prohibition in Additional Protocol II (‘AP II’). Initially, a similar provision to that 
																																																						
46 ibid. 
47 ibid. 
48 ibid 345. 
49 Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law: Volume I 
(International Committee of the Red Cross 2005) 337. 
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contained in AP I was included in the draft protocol. Draft Article 26(5) specified that ‘[t]he 
parties to the [non-international] conflict shall not use the civilian population or civilians in 
attempts to shield military objectives from attacks.’50 Despite this initial draft, the adopted 
version of the text reflected a simplified version of Draft Article 26, proposed by Pakistan.51 
It excluded paragraph 5 from the final version of the article. However, the exclusion cannot 
undermine the importance of the provision relating to human shields. This is evident from the 
statement made by the Norwegian delegation whereby the rejection of the most important 
parts of Article 26 were ‘serious blows to the humanitarian cause’.52 It further added that the 
intrinsic value of Protocol II was to be found in the provisions for protection of the civilian 
population and civilian objects and that the adoption of some parts of Article 26 nevertheless 
represented some very modest progress.53 
 Yet some provisions of AP II indirectly address this issue. Like Article 19 of the 
Third Geneva Convention, Article 5(2)(c) of AP II provides for the evacuation of persons 
deprived of their liberty from combat areas so that they are not exposed to danger. 
Additionally, Article 13(1) stipulates that the civilian population and individual civilians 
‘shall enjoy general protection against the dangers arising from military operations.’  
 Moreover, the use of human shields has often been associated with the taking of 
hostages.54 The prohibition of hostage taking has been incorporated in Article 4(2)(c) of AP 
II, as well as in Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949. Common Article 3 is 
not only considered to be customary IHL, but it also lays down the minimum standards to be 
respected during any armed conflict.55 It can also be argued that the norms enshrined in 
Common Article 3 have obtained the status of erga omnes obligations, having been defined 
as ‘elementary considerations of humanity’.56 Scholars go even further by claiming the 
provisions laid down in Common Article 3 satisfy the criteria to be designated as jus cogens 
norms and are thus applicable at all times, in all circumstances and to all states and from 
which no derogation at any time is permitted.57 Therefore, even if states initially rejected the 
																																																						
50 Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law (n 29) (vol 
I) 40. 
51 ibid (vol I) 81. 
52 ibid (vol VII) 206. 
53 ibid. 
54 Sandoz, Swinarski, and Zimmermann (n 36) 680. 
55 Prosecutor v Tadic (Appeals Judgment) ICTY-94-1-A (15 July 1999) [70]. 
56 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America), 
Merits, Judgment [1986] ICJ Rep 14 [218]. 
57 Rafael Nieto-Navia, International Peremptory Norms (Jus Cogens) and International Humanitarian Law in 
Man’s Inhumanity to Man: Essays on International Law in Honour of Antonio Cassese (Kluwer Law 
International 2003) 638. 
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proposed inclusion of the provision concerning the use of human shields in the final version 
of AddiAP II, practice has developed to adapt the rules on the use of human shields in 
international armed conflict to those regulating NIACs.58 Consequently, it can be deduced 
that the general legal norms governing the use of human shields are applicable in both 
international and non-international armed conflicts. This conclusion is also supported by the 
ICRC which has explicitly reminded parties to both international and non-international armed 
conflicts that the prohibition of using human shields extends to both types of conflict.59 
However, some discrepancies do occur and the most notable exception concerns the 
possibility that this crime be prosecuted before the ICC under the Rome Statute. The 
prohibition discussed in section B.4 pertains only to crimes committed during an international 
armed conflict. 
 Having outlined the legal framework governing the use of human shields in both 
international and non-international armed conflicts, the analysis can now move on to the next 
section where the conclusions so far will be opposed to the principles of IHL which the 
attacking party must observe. This will be illustrated with examples from both types of 
conflict. 
 
C.  LEGALITY OF ATTACKS UNDER THE PRINCIPLES OF IHL 
In this section, the relevant principles of IHL are applied in answering the main question as to 
what constitutes a legitimate attack against human shields. Three steps will be undertaken in 
achieving this task. First, the status of human shields under international law in relation to the 
principle of distinction will be examined. In particular, the issue of whether human shields 
directly take part in hostilities will be analysed. Second, taking into consideration the legal 
status of human shields, the question whether human shields should be excluded from the 
proportionality assessment will be addressed. Finally, the matter whether the issuing of an 
advance warning by the attacking party affects its obligations vis-à-vis the civilians forming 
the human shield will be discussed. 
    1.  Direct participation in hostilities 
Generally speaking, civilians are persons who are not members of armed forces or militias.60 
Their protection under IHL is not unlimited as they waive their civilian protection when they 
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engage in direct participation of hostilities (‘DPH’).61 Consequently, civilians can be lawfully 
targeted and, as opposed to combatants, prosecuted for their mere participation in 
hostilities.62  
DPH is an ambiguous concept. Overall, it is perceived as composed of acts of war, which by 
their nature or purpose are likely to cause actual harm to personnel or equipment of the 
enemy armed forces.63 This rule was further elaborated by the ICRC with the adoption of its 
Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under International 
Humanitarian Law (‘ICRC Guidance on DPH’). A crucial novelty introduced therein was the 
inclusion of three cumulative criteria that define DPH: a threshold of harm, a direct causal 
link between the act and the harm likely to result, and a belligerent nexus.64 Although heavily 
criticised,65 it is claimed that the Guidance adopted a neutral, impartial, and balanced 
approach, resisting proposals coming from both extremes, whilst ensuring that the final 
interpretation would still be commensurate with the foundational principles of IHL.66 
Furthermore, the three conditions do not seem to be disputed. In his critique on the 
constitutive elements in the ICRC Guidance on DPH, Schmitt agrees with all three 
constitutive elements in principle, noting only that the Guidance defines them too 
restrictively.67 Therefore, given the fact that the constitutive elements are seemingly not 
disputed in their essence, they can be used as basic guidelines in the present analysis. In 
applying these elements, the analysis will take into account – but will not be limited to – the 
ICRC’s interpretation. 
a)  Involuntary human shields and direct participation in hostilities 
It is hardly conceivable that a person, who is held and positioned in front of a military 
objective against his will, can be considered as taking DPH. An unequivocal example of use 
of involuntary human shields can be provided in the case of the Tamil Tigers (‘LTTE’) in Sri 
Lanka. In May 2009, forced to retreat by government offensive operations, the LTTE drove 
civilians into a narrow strip of land on Sri Lanka's north-eastern coast, effectively using 
																																																						
61 ibid 19–20. 
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65 See Michael Schmitt, ‘The Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities: A 
Critical Analysis’ (2010) 1 Harvard National Security Journal 5, 39–43.  
66 Shannon Bosch, ‘Targeting Decisions Involving Voluntary Human Shields in International Armed Conflicts 
in Light of the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities’ (2013) 46 Comparative and International Law 
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several hundred thousand people as human shields. In addition, the LTTE shot at and injured 
or killed many of those trying to flee from the war zone to government-held territory.68 In 
another example prior to these events, Iraq became arguably the first state to announce 
publicly that it would resort to the use of human shields during the First Gulf war.69 Iraqi 
forces captured foreign citizens and treated them as hostages. Many of them, together with 
Iraqi citizens, were used as human shields, placed at or near military and strategic facilities to 
deter attacks.70 
 In instances such as these, the involuntary human shields do not meet the 
requirements for DPH. Being equated to hostages, there appears to be no belligerent nexus 
between the shields and the shielding party. Dinstein argues that acting under duress and 
absent complicity, involuntary human shields cannot be regarded as civilians DPH and their 
use as such even carries criminal consequences.71 Given the almost unanimous agreement 
among scholars on the subject,72 it can be concluded that involuntary human shields retain 
their civilian protection under IHL.  
b)  Voluntary human shields and direct participation in hostilities 
The position of voluntary human shields is less clear.73 Scholars are divided as to whether 
voluntary shields are civilians protected against direct attack or civilians DPH and therefore 
targetable.74  
 Authors such as Dinstein maintain that voluntary human shields are DPH and thus 
waive their civilian protection.75 Advocates of this approach argue that voluntary shields take 
affirmative steps to frustrate harm to objects (or persons) that make a direct contribution to 
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the military effort and, in doing so, contribute to the military action in a direct causal way.76 
Hence, it is difficult to interpret their behaviour as anything but direct participation.77 
Additionally, the Israeli High Court of Justice in Public Committee against Torture in Israel 
held on the issue of human shields that: 
If they are doing so because they were forced to do so by terrorists, those innocent civilians 
are not to be seen as taking a direct part in the hostilities. … However, if they do so of their 
own free will, out of support for the terrorist organization, they should be seen as persons 
taking a direct part in the hostilities.78 
Nonetheless, this view cannot be fully supported. Relying on the ICRC’s definition of ‘direct 
participation’, ‘actual harm’ must be caused to enemy personnel or military equipment.79 
Voluntary human shields act passively and do not strike the enemy directly.80 Nevertheless, 
the ICRC Guidance on DPH considers that while acts of voluntary human shields may cause 
harm,81 it would arguably only be indirect.82 This view is highly controversial.83 Arguably 
such a direct link is possible, but only as far as the threat posed is immediate and imminent. 
This may include a scenario where voluntary shields deliberately create a physical obstacle 
hindering enemy ground operations or protect a weapon about to strike the enemy forces. 
Authors have illustrated this imminent threat by describing a soldier advancing toward a tank 
with a civilian strapped to it, forcing the soldier to choose between his own death and using 
lethal force against someone normally immune to attack.84  
 There appears to be no consistent practice with regard to the question if voluntary 
human shields amount to DPH. The phenomenon of voluntary human shields received 
considerable media coverage during the 2003 Iraq war when foreign peace activists travelled 
to strategic locations in Iraq, such as oil refineries and power stations, in order to forestall 
American military strikes.85 Even though most of these activists eventually fled the theatre of 
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war, Schmitt argues they would have forfeited their protection if they had remained.86 US 
officials claimed that ‘you certainly could argue that since [voluntary human shields are] 
working in the service of the Iraqi government, they may, in fact, have crossed the line 
between combatant and non-combatant’.87 The US citizens among the activists were 
prosecuted for having acted as voluntary human shields in Iraq.88  
 Nevertheless, the threshold for such determination should be extremely high and it 
should be presumed that voluntary human shields normally do not reach it. In order for the 
causal link between the conduct and the resulting harm to exist, the actual harm in question 
must be brought about in one single step.89 Although the term ‘one single step’ used by the 
drafters of the Interpretive Guidance is not entirely clear, it is suggested that it entails a clear 
link between the act and the ensuing harm.90 Unless the voluntary human shield poses a 
physical obstacle preventing ground forces from advancing, or shields a weapon about to 
strike, the link remains indirect. It remains doubtful whether such a direct link existed in the 
case of Operation Iraqi Freedom.  
 The concept of DPH should be applied restrictively.91 Although it is possible that 
actions of voluntary human shields amount to DPH, the threshold for such determination 
should be set high.92 Accordingly, each individual’s actions should be assessed on a case-by-
case basis as to whether they constitute DPH93 and it cannot be assumed that all civilians 
voluntarily protecting certain military objectives can be lawfully attacked. This finding 
impacts on the principle of proportionality, described as the most important extension or 
extrapolation of the principle of distinction.94 
    2.  Proportionality assessment 
Following the analysis made above it can be deduced that, generally, due to the protection 
human shields are entitled to, the principle of proportionality remains applicable. But even if 
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the concept of human shields as civilians DPH can be dismissed, the question arises whether 
they should still be included in the proportionality assessment.  
Arguments have been made that even though human shields retain their civilian protection, 
they should be excluded from the proportionality equation due to the military nature of the 
targets they shield.95 This seems to be the approach taken by the US with the adoption of the 
latest 2015 Department of Defense Law of War Manual (DoD Manual). The DoD Manual 
states that the use of human shields does not alter the legal obligations of the attacking party 
to discriminate in carrying out attacks against the enemy.96 If human shields are considered in 
proportionality calculations, then a higher anticipated military advantage is required to render 
the attack lawful. Thus, human shields would alter the attacking party’s legal obligations.97 
As a result, according to the US DoD Manual, human shields should be excluded from the 
proportionality assessment.98 However, this conclusion seems inaccurate as the following two 
sections will demonstrate.  
a)  Involuntary human shields in the proportionality assessment 
Scholars such as Rubinstein and Roznai have distinguished between involuntary and 
unknowing human shields, arguing that the proportionality assessment must be adapted to the 
circumstances.99 This distinction is made in relation to the taking of precautionary measures 
(see section C.3). An advance warning would make the unknowing civilians aware that they 
are situated near a military target and enable them to find shelter. When involuntary human 
shields protect the military objective, the warning is intended to inform the party using the 
human shields that their objective is about to be targeted in spite of the use of civilian 
presence.100 Finally, these authors affirm that in both cases the shields retain their civilian 
protection and the present author supports this conclusion. 
 However, Rubinstein and Roznai go even further, asserting that when the use of 
involuntary or unknowing human shields is part of a widespread or systematic policy, the 
measure of proportionality must be adjusted.101 They argue that when civilians are placed as 
shields next to a military objective, the proportionality assessment cannot be detached from 
the shielding party’s actions and ought to take into account the incentive to illegally use 
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civilians as human shields.102 This concept of ‘adjustment’ of the proportionality assessment 
is also put forward by Dinstein. He contends that although the principle of proportionality 
applies to involuntary human shields, the test of what amounts to excessive injury to civilians 
must be ‘relaxed’.103  
 This approach seems to be misguided. It might have some practical implications in 
terms of removing the incentive of the shielding party to take advantage of the protected 
status civilians enjoy,104 but it contradicts core IHL principles, such as the principle of non-
reciprocity. This principle has been explicitly pointed out in Article 51(8) in AP I whereby 
any violation of the obligations enshrined in Article 51 (including the use of human shields) 
shall not release the parties to the conflict from their legal obligations with respect to 
civilians.  
 Dinstein refers to the text of Article 51(8) as a ‘curious provision that seems to punish 
the complying party for an adversary’s bad faith’.105 He finds support in the text of the UK 
Manual on the Law of Armed Conflict which states that ‘the enemy’s unlawful activity may 
be taken into account in considering whether the incidental loss or damage was proportionate 
to the military advantage expected’.106 Moreover, he uses the Israeli bombardment over 
Beirut in 1982 in order to highlight that the high number of civilian casualties was not 
necessarily excessive given the fact that the military targets were placed amongst the civilian 
population.107 
 Again, this approach seems flawed. As for the first argument put forward, although 
exceptions exist, the majority of military manuals provide for respect for the principle of non-
reciprocity.108 Furthermore, in its study on customary IHL, the ICRC presented abundant 
evidence to conclude that this principle reflects customary IHL.109 As for the second 
argument, one might argue that the bombings over Beirut do not represent contemporary IHL 
pertaining to the use of and attacks against human shields. For instance, during the NATO 
campaign against Yugoslavia in 1999, the Allied forces were reluctant to make such bold 
statements despite the use of human shields by the Serbs. On the contrary, the 2000 NATO 
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Secretary-General’s report affirmed that the selection of targets was carefully reviewed at 
multiple levels of command in order to ensure compliance with international law.110 In 
addition, the report stated that the concern to avoid unintentional damage was a principal 
constraining factor and many targets were not attacked because the risk to non-combatants 
was considered too high despite the reported use of human shields by the Serbs.111 It can be 
deduced from these statements that the use of human shields did not alter the proportionality 
assessment. Even if on some occasions these statements do not reflect reality,112 the fact that 
NATO officials conceded that attacks against human shields cause excessive damage  (as that 
over Beirut) ensures that it is perceived that human shields should not presuppose a looser 
assessment. 
 It is thus contended that proportionality assessment should remain strict and in no way 
are involuntary human shields to be excluded from the equation. 
b)  Voluntary human shields in the proportionality assessment 
In the analysis so far, it was determined that generally voluntary human shields, like 
involuntary ones, do not engage in DPH (see section C.1(b)). Nevertheless, the next question 
that arises is whether the same proportionality assessment criteria are applicable to voluntary 
human shields. 
 Indeed this is the case in most scenarios. Logically, the proponents of the notion that 
voluntary human shields are DPH support the view that ‘it would be incongruent to suggest 
they should nevertheless count in proportionality calculations’.113 The main argument in 
support of the view that voluntary human shields should be excluded from the proportionality 
assessment is that should they be excluded, they would be unable to achieve their goals and 
thus lose their incentive to expose themselves to risk because they would not alter the 
obligations of the attacking party nor pose any legal obstacles in carrying out the attacks.114 
However, given the fact that under the current legal framework there is no provision 
explicitly addressing the issue of voluntary human shields, it appears they remain covered by 
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the general legal framework pertaining to human shields.115 Hence, the protection normally 
afforded to involuntary human shields would apply to voluntary ones. As a result, voluntary 
human shields must not be excluded from the proportionality assessment. 
 Practice also seems to support this view. During the 1999 Yugoslavian war, there 
were occasions when hundreds of civilians flocked onto the bridges in Belgrade in order to 
shield them from NATO airstrikes.116 In relation to these events, the NATO commander was 
adamant that ‘no responsible commander wishes to kill civilians … Every day we did our 
very, very best to limit collateral damage and limit the loss of life on the adversary’s side’.117 
If commanders perceived voluntary shields as DPH and not to be included in the 
proportionality assessment, they would not have been considered as possible collateral 
damage.  
 Nevertheless, another factor needs to be taken into consideration, known as ‘the 
inherent risk run by voluntary human shields’.118 Although voluntary human shields do not 
lose civilian protection under IHL, they are at greater risk of being targeted by virtue of their 
proximity to a military target.119 Hence an analogy may be drawn between voluntary human 
shields and workers in armament or munitions factories.120 In both cases, the individuals 
continue to benefit from their civilian protection, but as long as the attacking party can prove 
that the military necessity to attack the military objective was in proportion to the civilian 
losses incurred, the operation would be lawful in spite of the greater number of casualties 
expected.121 
 The main concern in this regard is the definition of “excessive”. The workers in 
armament or munitions factories, as well as the voluntary human shields, run the ‘inherent 
risk’. Nonetheless, the former (similarly to involuntary human shields) lack the volitional 
element to shield. On the other hand, voluntary human shields are fully aware that they are 
shielding a military objective and have the intention to do so. Thus, it seems reasonable to 
expect that what amounts to an excessive attack in normal circumstances might not be 
excessive if the casualties were voluntary human shields.122 It can therefore be deduced that a 
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somewhat looser proportionality test should be acceptable on the occasion that the civilians 
voluntarily expose themselves to military attacks. This, however, is not meant to support 
Dinstein’s notion that attacks against military objectives may proceed as if the voluntary 
human shield were not there.123 It is argued that proportionality must generally remain 
applicable although more civilian damage is to be accepted when determining the threshold 
for an “excessive” attack. Inevitably, particularly when voluntary human shields are involved, 
proportionality calculations would depend on a unique set of circumstances.124  
 Consequently, the bridges in Belgrade could have been legitimately targeted with a 
bigger number of casualties anticipated in comparison to a hypothetical situation in which 
they were held there against their will. It should be noted that children must not be considered 
voluntary human shields under any circumstances as they cannot be considered as having a 
will of their own.125 Moreover, a looser assessment must be applied only in exceptional 
circumstances given the blurred lines between voluntary and involuntary human shields. Only 
when there is sufficient evidence that civilians are shielding a military target on their own 
free will should the shields be considered voluntary (see section C.2(c)). Therefore, in most 
cases the stricter, regular proportionality assessment would apply.  
 The observations so far can be concluded by reiterating that the principle of 
proportionality should generally remain applicable to human shields in all circumstances, as 
opposed to the approach stipulated in the US DoD Manual (see section C.2). The 
proportionality assessment should remain strict in the case of involuntary human shields 
while a looser assessment is conceivable only when civilians voluntarily expose themselves 
to attacks. Moreover, despite the existing notions that voluntary human shields are DPH and 
should not be considered in proportionality calculations, practice shows that they do enjoy a 
form of protected status in the theatre of war.126 Only on rare occasions when their actions 
can directly contribute to the damage suffered by the enemy can they be considered as DPH 
and thus eligible to be attacked for the time they do so. Moreover, in the very recent update of 
the US DoD Manual, the Department of Defense seemingly changed its approach and deleted 
the controversial paragraph cited in the present article. DoD General Counsel Jennifer 
O’Connor stated in November 2016 that the then forthcoming change ‘will provide greater 
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clarity on the DoD legal view of human shields, noting that whether voluntary or involuntary, 
civilian “human shields” would not be considered to be directly participating in hostilities 
and would not thereby lose their protections from attack. Specifically, the revised Manual 
clarifies that the proportionality rule applies to these individuals’.127 Although this change 
also gave rise to criticism,128 it supports the findings in the present article and abides by the 
contemporary legal standards governing the use of human shields. In addition, the edited 
DoD Manual takes the stance that only in some cases, which are to be assessed on a case-by-
case basis, can voluntary human shields be considered as DPH.129 Whether the new Manual 
will also adopt the approach of a looser proportionality test with regard to voluntary human 
shields is yet to be seen.  The new edited Manual already includes a curious provision that 
leaves room for a similar interpretation whereby ‘[a]lthough human shields who are civilians 
are to be considered as civilians in determining whether a planned attack would be excessive, 
enemy use of voluntary human shields may be considered as a factor in assessing the legality 
of an attack.’130 The evolution of the US stance on human shields as illustrated by the DoD 
Manual can serve as evidence for the unification of view and practice in this part of IHL in 
line with the findings in the present article. 
c)  Distinction between Voluntary/Involuntary human shields 
Referring to the findings in the previous two sections, it is deemed necessary to examine the 
issue of distinction between voluntary and involuntary human shields, an issue rather 
overlooked.  
 For instance, there have been very recent reported cases of Syrian rebel groups using 
caged civilians as human shields in order to deter attacks against their strongholds around 
Damascus.131 However, one could also argue that it is possible for civilians to consent to be 
detained in such cages. On the one hand, this would influence the public opinion in relation to 
potential attacks against the human shields. On the other hand, taking into account the 
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conclusions from sections C.2(a) and C.2(b), these actions could also alter the proportionality 
assessment.  
 Vice versa, what if civilians appear to shield a military target voluntarily, whilst in 
reality they are coerced to do so? Then the coercing party would not lose credibility while the 
civilians risk their lives to an even bigger extent than if they were undoubtedly held against 
their will. Thus, when no reliable information proving a specific volitional element to shield 
is available, the presumption must be that those civilians act involuntarily.132 
 It is problematic that such an act cannot fall under perfidy as defined in the Hague 
Regulations133 and AP I.134 The prohibition enshrined in these instruments only concerns the 
killing, injuring or capturing of an adversary by resort to perfidy.135 In the present case the 
adversary suffers no such harm. As a result, the attacking party could be misled without any 
legal consequences. Depending on the circumstances, this could further hamper the attacking 
party’s military operations. Additionally, it might lead to more casualties.  
 In sum, given the findings that a difference concerning the legality of attacks against 
voluntary and involuntary human shields does exist, it can be concluded that the legal 
framework pertaining to perfidy should be expanded to include acts as exemplified in this 
section. 
    3.  Advance warnings 
The principle of precautions in attack is the final relevant principle regarding the lawfulness 
of attacks. In order to comply with this principle, when a choice between several military 
objectives for obtaining similar military advantage is possible, the attacking party must select 
the objective which is not shielded by civilians.136 However, if a shielded military target has 
no alternative and the strike would be proportionate, then Article 57(2)(c) of AP I demands 
effective advance warnings to be given, ‘unless circumstances do not permit [so].’ These 
warnings could make a significant difference in reducing the number of civilian casualties, 
especially in the cases of voluntary or unknowing human shields. 
 But what constitutes an effective advance warning? It is not easy to determine what 
kind of advance warning would be considered effective, nor is it clear how specific and direct 
the warning has to be.137 For example, the Commission of Inquiry on Lebanon has stated that 
if a military force is serious in its attempts to warn civilians to evacuate because of impending 
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danger, it should take into account how they expect the civilian population to carry out the 
instructions.138 It also noted the importance of the warning being timely, giving the civilians 
sufficient time to evacuate and ensuring they are not attacked while evacuating.139 Thus it 
seems difficult to determine the specificity of an advance warning, reconciling the protection 
of the civilian population with the gaining of military advantage.140 The proposed adequacy 
of an advance warning depends on whether it reaches those who are exposed to danger, 
whether it is clear and credible, and specific enough regarding the location to be affected.141 
Moreover, the requirement that the warning be timely should also imply that it must not be 
made too early as then the upcoming attack could be conceived as false.142 
 Given that an advance warning is made, what are the consequences for the human 
shields if they remain in the vicinity of the military objective after the warning was issued? 
Some commentators argue that in the case of voluntary human shields, a refusal to abandon 
the shielded object constitutes DPH.143 Furthermore, Israeli practice in Lebanon shows Israeli 
officials believed that everyone who remained behind after the dropping of the leaflets that 
served as advance warnings was linked to Hezbollah, and therefore a legitimate target of 
attack.144 The leaflets also alerted that any pickup truck or truck travelling south of the Litani 
River will be suspected of transporting rockets and weapons and may be bombed.145  
 The present author firmly disagrees with these approaches. Firstly, the taking of 
precautionary measures should not be confused with the principle of distinction. Therefore, if 
voluntary human shields do not fulfil the criteria for DPH as described above, they would still 
not be participating directly even if an advance warning is issued. If civilians retain their 
civilian protection while shielding a military target, the warning itself does not deprive them 
of this protection. A proportionality assessment should be made before carrying out the 
attack. Hence, an advance warning merely informs the voluntary shields that a potential 
attack against them has been considered proportionate. It is up to them to decide whether they 
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would remain in the area to be attacked under these circumstances. It is part of the inherent 
risk they face when engaging in shielding military targets. As for the second approach taken 
in the conflict in Lebanon, it totally disregards the principle of distinction. In addition, it is 
widely open for abuse. For instance, Israel stated that during the bombings in 2006 the 
advance warnings made were large-scale, exceeding the demands of international law in their 
attempts to keep the number of fatalities among the population to a bare minimum.146 In 
reality, many people were unable to leave either because they were part of a vulnerable 
group, had no means of transportation or simply because the destruction of infrastructure 
made it impossible.147 Many of those who left were attacked on their way out.148 Therefore, 
the assumption that an advance warning could give the attacking party carte blanche to attack 
indiscriminately an entire area without taking into consideration the possibilities for the 
civilians used as shields to benefit from the warning is inadmissible. Even if the warnings 
were effective, there is no legal basis in IHL whereby an advance warning precludes respect 
for the principles of IHL. Article 57(5) of AP I explicitly states that no provision in Article 57 
(including advance warnings) may be construed as authorising any attacks against the civilian 
population, civilians or civilian objects. Although in the example given Israel is not a party to 
AP I,149 the ICRC maintains that all obligations with respect to the principle of distinction 
and the conduct of hostilities remain applicable even if civilians remain in the zone of 
operations after a warning has been issued.150 Thus, neither voluntary nor 
involuntary/unknowing human shields can be excluded from the proportionality assessment 
on the basis that they have remained in the vicinity of a military objective after an advance 
warning was given. 
 A more problematic issue arises in relation to the obligations of the attacking party 
compared to those of the defending party when it comes to precautionary measures. It is 
argued that the prohibition of the use of human shields and the obligation to remove the 
civilian population from the vicinity of military objectives151 provide for dissimilar 
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standards.152 While the violation of the former requires a specific intent to shield, the 
violation of the latter is not that strict (‘endeavour to remove’). As a result, the obligations for 
the defending party seem to resemble recommendations rather than strict obligations.153 This 
disparity in the legal weight of the provisions has been reflected in the criticism against the 
Goldstone report.154 In fact, the Report only concludes that Palestinians were not forced to act 
as human shields and fails to mention the obligation to remove civilians from the vicinity of 
military objectives.155 Nevertheless, when discussing the legality of attacks against human 
shields, the principle of non-reciprocity should be taken into account (see section C.2(a)). 
Although it can be agreed that a disparity does exist, the law, as it stands, allows the carrying 
out of attacks in light of the principles of distinction, proportionality and precaution, 
regardless of whether the enemy abides by those principles. Therefore, although some 
intermingling of civilians and combatants is virtually inevitable,156 this does not release the 
attacking party from its own obligations. 
 In sum, the issuing of an advance warning does not preclude parties from applying the 
principles of distinction and proportionality as demonstrated in the Lebanon example. As for 
the disparity between the obligations of the attacking and the defending party, the principle of 
non-reciprocity remains applicable. Hence the criticism towards the Goldstone report relating 
to that point is more of a political nature than of a legal one. 
 
D. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, attacks against human shields can be lawful, but only if they are in compliance 
with the basic principles of IHL. The principles of non-reciprocity, distinction, 
proportionality and precaution were examined as the main pillars of IHL which contain the 
legal framework pertaining to human shields. In applying those principles to the phenomenon 
of human shields, an attempt was made to give guidance on the legality of attacks against 
human shields under the current IHL framework. Firstly, it was ascertained that human 
shields in general continue to enjoy civilian protection. Involuntary/unknowing human 
shields retain their civilian protection under any circumstances. On certain rare occasions, 
voluntary human shields can be considered as DPH thereby losing their civilian protection, 
but only if their actions cause direct danger to the attacking party. Nevertheless, in most cases 
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both voluntary and involuntary human shields are not directly targetable. Secondly, it was 
explored how the application of the principle of distinction affects the proportionality 
assessment. Both involuntary and voluntary human shields should be included in the 
proportionality assessment as a corollary of their continuing civilian protection. A less 
restrictive proportionality assessment is possible for voluntary human shields due to their 
own choice to expose themselves to risk. Naturally, voluntary human shields, which satisfy 
the requirements for DPH, would not be taken into account in the equation. Whether they 
satisfy the DPH criteria should be determined on a case-by-case basis and if there is no 
sufficient evidence for an intent to shield a military object, then the rule of doubt should be 
applied. Hence human shields are involuntary until proven otherwise. Finally, it was 
maintained that the issuing of advance warnings does not exclude the attacking party’s 
obligations under the principles of distinction and proportionality. Regardless of whether the 
shields are voluntary or involuntary, the issuing of an advance warning does not deprive 
civilians of their civilian protection or alter the proportionality assessment. Besides, even if 
the defending party fails to comply with its obligations under IHL, the attacking party must 
still abide by them in light of the principle of non-reciprocity. 
 So, is the contemporary legal framework adequate? It has been argued that human 
shields present a practical critique of international law by exposing its ambiguous distinctions 
and the political implications that follow from their constitutive character.157 Other authors 
have insisted that there is no need for a new framework, since DPH is an adequate tool to 
deal with this issue.158 Perhaps both sides are right. In applying the contemporary rules of 
IHL to the problem of human shields it was proved that the current legal framework has the 
capacity to deal with this phenomenon. Nevertheless, this does not mean there is no room for 
improvement. Regulations on voluntary human shields should be codified in order to avoid 
abuse and ambiguity. It was shown that the drafters of the contemporary IHL instruments 
failed to specifically address this question. As a result, ambiguity renders interpretation of 
norms related to voluntary human shields open to abuse. Therefore, an explicit agreement 
should be reached defining the levels of protection voluntary human shields are entitled to in 
order to facilitate legal compliance from the parties to an armed conflict. Moreover, in the 
analysis it was pointed out that if a distinction in the levels of protection enjoyed by 
involuntary and voluntary human shields truly exists, then the deception by the defending 
party should amount to perfidy. Nowadays warfare has evolved in a way that perfidy not only 
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leads to physical harm to the attacker, but could also impose stricter legal obligations. 
Finally, more pressure should be put on defending parties to act under Article 58 of AP I in 
order to prevent to the biggest extent possible difficult choices before the attacking parties. 
The obligations of the defending party to prevent human shielding should be put on equal 
terms as those of the attacking party not to attack them indiscriminately. 
 Yet the present author merely presented the legality of attacks against human shields 
in an ideal manner where IHL is applied in good faith. In practice, IHL violations occur in 
almost any armed conflict. Furthermore, even if the potential attack is legal, would the 
attacking party overcome the moral and political constraints in launching it? In the case of 
human shields, the attacking party does not estimate the approximate collateral damage 
which might occur, but it directly aims at and intentionally targets an objective where the 
casualties are almost certain to result.159 The current discussion did not include the moral side 
of the issue. It is up to military commanders to decide whether the moral and political 
considerations outweigh the legal and military ones. Still, civilians remain civilians 
regardless of whether they are utilized by the defending party to deter attacks or not.  
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